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SPOT ZONING
Spot zoning1 is the reclassification by zoning amendment2 of a
small parcel of land to allow a use beneficial to the property owner
but detrimental to his neighbors3 or to the community at large.4
Courts have condemned spot zoning as the antithesis of planned de-
velopment 5 since the proposed use is either inconsistent with sur-
rounding uses6 or does not conform to the comprehensive plan.7
I. Unfortunately the term "spot zoning" has no single, universally accepted
meaning. Some courts use the term to describe any small area rezoning, regardless of
the validity of the change. Eg., Tennison v. Shomette, 38 Md. App. 1, 379 A.2d 187
(1977) (spot zoning not per se illegal). The narrower, and more useful, definition
requires that the rezoning be inconsistent with existing zoning patterns without any
substantial public purpose, hence illegal. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZON-
ING § 5.08 (2d ed. 1976). This article adopts the second definition.
2. Although variances or special use permits can achieve the same practical results
as amendatory zoning, they are based on specific statutory and ordinance provisions
to which the rules of spot zoning should not properly apply. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERI-
CAN PLANNING LAW § 27.07 (1974), accord R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 5.08.
See Evergreen State Builders, Inc. v. Pierce County, 9 Wash. App. 973, 980, 516 P.2d
775, 779 (1973) (unclassified use permit not zoning); Glidden v. Town of Nottingham,
109 N.H. 134, 244 A.2d 430 (1968) (argument that variance constitutes "spot zoning"
misconstrues the term); Duggins v. Board of County Comm'rs, 179 Kan. 101, 293
P.2d 258 (1956) (special use permit not spot zoning because zoning ordinance autho-
rizes such permits).
3. E.g., Rochester Ass'n of Neighborhoods v. City of Rochester, 268 N.W.2d 885
(Minn. 1978) (spot zoning characterized by substantial diminution of neighboring
property); see 5 P. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 38.04[4] (1982); N.
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at § 27.03.
4. E.g., Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Comm'n, 159 Conn. 585, 271 A.2d 319
(1970) (zoning change from residential to commercial valid, beneficial to community
as a whole); Andersen v. Zoning Comm'n, 157 Conn. 285, 253 A.2d 16 (1968) (exten-
sion of business zone valid as an orderly development that promotes public interest);
see R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 5.10; 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 3, at §§ 38.0212],
38.05 [31.
5. Jones v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 32 N.J. Super. 397, 108 A.2d 498 (1954),
cited with approval in R. ANDERSON, supra note I, at § 50.08.
6. E.g., Lancaster Dev., Ltd. v. Village of River Forest, 85 IM. App. 2d 395, 228
N.E.2d 526 (1967) (amendatory ordinance which would not preserve residential char-
acter of area held spot zoning); see R. ANDERSON, supra note I, at § 5.12.
7. Eg., Lee v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 411 A.2d 635 (D.C. 1980)
(to constitute spot zoning municipal action must be inconsistent with the comprehen-
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Courts generally accord deference to the municipal legislature by
presuming the validity of its ordinances.' When a municipality per-
mits a use inconsistent with its comprehensive plan, however, it is in
effect revising the public policy judgments embodied in the plan. 9
The smaller the parcel affected, the greater the likelihood that the
rezoning is not in the general interest.10
Although the party challenging municipal legislation normally has
the burden of proof to show that the governmental act bears no rea-
sonable relation to the public health, morals, safety, or welfare, I I the
rezoning of a particularly small12 parcel may shift the burden to the
sive plan); Rosetta v. Washington County, 254 Or. 161, 458 P.2d 405 (1969) (rezoning
inconsistent with comprehensive plan constituted spot zoning); see 2 A. RATHKOPF
§§ 26.03, 26.05 (1981). See generally, Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehen-
sive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1976); Note, Spot Zoning and
the Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYRACusE L. REV. 303 (1959).
8. South Gwinett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
837 (1974) (adoption of zoning a quasi-legislative act not subject to federal considera-
tion absent arbitrariness); McGowan v. Cohalen, 41 N.Y.2d 434, 361 N.E.2d 1025,
393 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1977) (zoning classifications clothed in a presumption of validity;
the challenging party bears a heavy burden of proof). For a discussion of standards
of review relating to rezonings see 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 3, at § 39.02[l]. See also
Kolis, Citadels ofPrivilege: Exclusionary Land Use Regulations and the Presumption of
Constitutional Validity, 8 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 585, 588-95 (1981).
9. "A comprehensive zoning ordinance is law that binds the municipal body it-
self... The legislative body does not, on each rezoning hearing, redetermine as an
original matter, the city's policy of comprehensive zoning." City of Pharr v. Tippitt,
616 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. 1981).
10. "If the area rezoned involves only one lot or a few, the courts tend to get
suspicious, and look into the justification rather carefully. In effect, this sets up a
rebuttable presumption of dubious action. . . ." N. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at
§ 27.04. Cf. Little v. Board of County Comm'rs, - Mont. -, 631 P.2d 1282 (1981)
(smallness test more concerned with number of landowners benefitted than actual size
of area); Hansen v. City of Norfolk, 201 Neb. 352,267 N.W.2d 537 (1978) (that plain-
tiff's two acres is part of 100 acres similarly rezoned in itself persuasive refutation of
spot zoning).
11. Lee v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 411 A.2d 635, 640-41 (D.C.
1980). This application of the rational relation test to zoning ordinances derives from
the early landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), which defined the scope of municipal zoning authority under the police power.
12. Two note writers surveyed 125 cases that dealt with spot zoning. They found
a direct correlation between the size of the amended area and the validity of the
ordinance. Note, Spot Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV.
303, 305-06 (1959). Cf. Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash.2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
The spot that Lady MacBeth attempted to exorcise ("Out, damned spot! Out, I
say!") was probably imaginary and did not exist at all except in her imagination,
while sunspots, our dictionary says, may vary "from mere apparent points (prob-
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proponent. 13 He must then show that the proposed use is consistent
with surrounding uses, in accord with the master plan, or justified by
significant changes in the area.' 4
Faced with an allegation of spot zoning, courts examine first
whether the rezoning complies with the comprehensive plan. 5 There
can be cases where there is no plan, or where the plan either does not
establish a comprehensive zoning scheme16 or no longer reflects the
course of actual development.' 7 Courts will then look to the degree
of public benefit and to the characteristics of the land itself to deter-
mine the outcome.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LAND
Courts hold the rezoning of a limited area in a manner inconsistent
with the development or classification of the surrounding area to be
spot zoning.'" To take two extreme examples: if industrially zoned
or vacant land surrounds a small parcel which the municipality re-
zones from residential to industrial, the ordinance would be valid.
On the other hand, if that same parcel stood in the middle of a resi-
dential area, a court would find spot zoning. Such easy cases, how-
ever, are the exception. In a recent Georgia case, 19 a landowner
requested the town to rezone his vacant property from residential to
commercial so that he could build a self-service convenience store.
The parcel was at the fringe of a residential area along a heavily tray-
ably 1,000 miles across) to spaces of 100,000 miles in extent." So we believe that
each case must be determined in accordance with its circumstances.
Id. at 745, 453 P.2d at 849, quoting Mathis v. Hannan, 306 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1957).
13. R. ANDERSON, supra note 2, at § 5.18. The author expresses the caveat that
the cases do not reveal a consistent pattern. Id.
14. Id.
15. Eg., Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687
(Iowa 1980) (law requires that zoning decisions be made in accordance with master
plan).
16. Eg, Lee v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 411 A.2d 635 (D.C. 1980)
(until comprehensive plan formulated, zoning must be on uniform and comprehen-
sive basis).
17. Eg., Lanzer v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 163 Conn. 453, 313 A.2d 44
(1972) (allowing professional offices in residential area valid since the large homes
were no longer in demand for residential use).
18. Chokecherry Hills Estates v. Devel County, 294 N.W.2d 654 (S.D. 1980) (de-
nial of a request to rezone part of natural resource district to residential upheld).
19. Westbrook v. Board of Adjustment, 245 Ga. 15, 262 S.E.2d 785 (1980).
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eled highway. On the other side of the highway, zoned industrial,
stood a textile plant.20 The court admitted that the plant and high-
way lessened the suitability of plaintiff's land for residential use.
Nevertheless the court characterized the proposed change as spot
zoning.21 It found that a rezoning would generate increased traffic on
residential side streets, causing a safety hazard. In addition, the
property values of the surrounding residences would suffer.22
Conversely, courts will allow rezoning when the original classifica-
tion restricts property to a use for which it is unsuited. A recent Iowa
decision23 permitted a county board to rezone two parcels from agri-
cultural to industrial because they were "less suitable for farming,"'24
hence distinguishable from the surrounding farms.25 Similarly, an
Arkansas court held that the rezoning to commercial of a parcel orig-
inally classified residential did not constitute spot zoning because the
residential development had never occurred.26 Evidence of change in
an area may create a need for rezoning, but it is not clear what
changes are sufficient.27
II. PUBLIC BENEFIT
In the usual case, the rezoning of a limited area of land raises its
20. Id. at 16, 262 S.E.2d at 786.
21. Id. at 17, 262 S.E.2d at 787.
22. Id.
23. Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa
1980). The proponent sought the change so that he could build a hog slaughtering
plant. Id. at 691.
24. Id. at 696. At least twenty acres of one of the properties produced "nothing
but sand burrs." Id.
25. The dissent remained unconvinced. Judge Schultz found no substantial dif-
ference between the rezoned parcels and the surrounding farmland. Finding that the
change benefitted solely the industrial user, he decried such piecemeal zoning as dia-
metrically opposed to comprehensive planning. Id. at 698.
26. Riddell v. City of Brinkley, 272 Ark. 84,612 S.W.2d 116 (1981). Cf. Lancaster
Dev., Ltd. v. Village of River Forest, 85 IM. App. 2d 395, 228 N.E.2d 526 (1967)
(amendatory ordinance held to be spot zoning because it would not preserve the resi-
dential character of the area).
27. Compare Tompsen v. City of Palestine, 510 S.W.2d 579 (rex. Civ. App. 1974)
(street widening and street lighting changes insufficient to justify rezoning) and Hunt
v. City of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536 (rex. 1971) (increased traffic, street widening,
two new parking lots, and an increased school enrollment did not justify rezoning)
with Adams v. Reed, 239 Miss. 437, 606 So.2d 606, (1960) (conversion of highway
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property value.2 8 The landowner's private benefit alone cannot jus-
tify a rezoning. 9 Courts view the owner's prospective gain with dis-
favor if there is evidence that he acquired the land with notice of the
original classification and with the intention to convert it to a new
use.
30
More important than the owner's benefit is the effect of the rezon-
ing on his neighbors and the community at large. The interests of the
latter two groups, however, do not necessarily coincide. In Citizens
Association of Georgetown v. District of Columbia Zoning Commis-
sion,31 the local citizens group as well as the Advisory Neighborhood
Commission opposed the rezoning of part of two lots from residential
to commercial.32 The change was sought to allow the expansion of a
supermarket.33 The court deferred to the findings of the zoning com-
mission that there was a community need for expanded food market-
ing facilities. It concluded that deference to the commission's
decision would promote "orderly development. 34 Indeed one court
has recently reaffirmed the proposition that for neighbors of rezoned
property to prevail on the merits, they must show "fraud or corrup-
tion" or that the municipality is manifestly abusing its power "to the
oppression of the neighbors. 35
The interests of neighbors and the larger community may coalesce,
however, to provide strong support for a reclassification of a limited
28. Where the rezoning would lessen the value of the affected owner's property,
there is little danger that the governmental authority is pandering to the individual at
the public's expense. "Reverse" spot zoning claims do, however, arise. See text ac-
companying note 40 infra.
29. See note 27 supra.
30. In Westbrook v. Board of Adjustment, the Supreme Court of Georgia found
that commercial zoning of appeUant's vacant residential lot would result in a 1,000%
to 6,000% increase in market value. "The appellant purchased the property knowing
that it was zoned residential [and] undoubtedly paid a purchase price based upon its
value as a residential lot." 262 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Ga. 1980). In addition, the court
showed displeasure at the competitive advantage that the appellant's business would
enjoy by virtue of the uniqueness of the location. Id. 4ccord Chokecherry Hills Es-
tates v. Devel County, 294 N.W.2d 654, 656 (S.D. 1980) (unsuccessful applicant for
rezoning took "a gamble that he could succeed in changing the existing zoning law so
that he could realize a higher profit.").
31. 402 A.2d 36 (D.C. 1979).
32. Id. at 39, 49.
33. Id. at 38.
34. Id. at 49.
35. Johnson v. Glenn, 246 Ga. 685, 686, 273 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1980).
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area. Another recent District of Columbia decision upheld a zoning
change from detached single family dwellings to row houses.3 6 The
court found that the public in general would benefit from more af-
fordable housing37 and increased tax revenues.31 In addition, the
row houses would buffer the remaining detached house section from
traffic and nearby commercial districts without adverse environmen-
tal impacts.39
A public benefit rationale for rezoning will also prevail where a
land use requirement singles out a particular parcel for less favorable
treatment than the surrounding area--"reverse" spot zoning.40 In
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the United States
Supreme Court dealt with the city's landmark preservation law.
41
Unlike historic-district legislation, landmark laws place use restric-
tions on selected parcels.42 Nevertheless the Court found no spot
zoning because the law was tantamount to a comprehensive plan em-
bodying a public policy to promote the preservation of historic and
esthetic structures.
43
III. COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
Almost all state enabling statutes require zoning to comply with
the comprehensive plan.' Small area rezoning is valid if it results as
36. Lee v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 411 A.2d 635 (D.C. 1980).
37. Id. at 640. The court took judicial notice of the city's housing shortage. Id. at
642.
38. Id. at 640. Compare Ward v. Montgomery Township, 28 N.Y. 529, 147 A.2d
248 (1959) (pursuit of increased tax revenue worthy objective, rezoning to achieve it
legally unobjectionable) with Adams v. Reed, 239 Miss. 437, 123 So.2d 606 (1960)
(increase in tax revenues alone insufficient to justify rezoning).
39. 411 A.2d at 640.
40. See generally 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 3, at § 38.05 (same criteria of spot zon-
ing analysis applicable to cases of alleged reverse spot zoning).
41. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Plaintiff proposed to build, in accordance with the appli-
cable zoning ordinance, an office building of over fifty stories over Grand Central
Station, a designated landmark. The Landmarks Preservation Commission denied
the request.
42. Id. at 132..
43. Id.
44. Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975) (zoning deci-
sions must accord with the comprehensive plan; a subsequent zoning ordinance al-
lowing more intensive use must fail); Town of Palm Beach v. Royal Palm Beach
Hotel, Inc., 298 So.2d 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (amendatory rezoning must com-
ply with the overall zoning plan). See 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 3, at § 37.03[2].
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a logical development of the plan.45 Where there is no comprehen-
sive plan, courts require that amendatory zoning be on a "uniform
and comprehensive basis"' to achieve the same result. One court,
however, has turned the compliance rule on its head by indicating
that there could be no allegation of spot zoning where there was no
comprehensive plan.47
In jurisdictions which have comprehensive plans, judicial defer-
ence accorded to subsequent zoning amendments varies.4 8 Mary-
land, for example, has adopted the "change or mistake" rule. To
justify a rezoning not in strict compliance with the plan, the propo-
nent must show either that the planners made a mistake in the origi-
nal zoning ordinance or that subsequent development changes justify
the amendment.49 While such a judicial attitude may be appropriate
in dealing with recently enacted comprehensive plans, it hampers the
flexibility of municipalities operating under older plans to react to
changing perceptions of need. 50
45. Kutcher v. Town Planning Comm'n, 138 Conn. 705, 88 A.2d 538 (1952).
46. Lee v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 411 A.2d 635, 642 (D.C. 1980)
quoting Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm'n, 392 A.2d 1027, 1036 (D.C.
1978). The rule in Washington, D.C., which has no comprehensive plan, is: "To
constitute illegal spot zoning the Commission's action must ... be inconsistent...
with the character and zoning of the surrounding area, or the purpose of zoning regu-
lation, i.e., the public health, safety, and general welfare." Citizens Ass'n of
Georgetown v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 402 A.2d 36, 39-40 (D.C. 1979).
47. Montana Wildlife Federation v. Sager, - Mont. -, 620 P.2d 1189 (1980). In
Sager, two land owners succeeded in establishing planning and zoning districts coex-
tensive with the boundaries of their parcels in an unplanned area. Id. at -, 620 P.2d
at 1192. They then petitioned the zoning commission for an amendment to permit a
greater density of lots in the zoning districts. Id. The court rebuffed the spot zoning
allegation saying: "We have found no case ... which has held that the adoption of a
planning and zoning district within an otherwise unplanned [area] constitutes spot
zoning." Id. at -, 620 P.2d at 1199.
48. See generally Mandelker, supra note 7, at 899, 931-44 (1976) (the role of the
comprehensive plan in the zoning amendment process).
49. Tennison v. Shomette, 38 Md, App. 1, 379 A.2d 187 (1977) (original zoning
classification of landowner's parcel found to be a mistake). Although the rule sounds
harsh, the court applied the traditional tests--suitability of land for its original classi-
fication, the effect of the amendment on the surrounding area-to find the issue of
mistake fairly debatable. Once a zoning issue becomes fairly debatable, the court will
defer to the zoning authority. Id. at 6-7, 379 A.2d at 190. See generally 6 P. ROHAN,
supra note 3, at § 39.02[3] (investigation of the change or mistake rule).
50. The need for flexibility has caused planners to turn away from fixed "end-
use" plans with their detailed maps to a more open and flexible policies plan which
stresses process. D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF
LAND DEVELOPMENT 58-70 (1979).
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Other courts, although they consider the master plan binding on
the municipal legislature's subsequent zoning decisions, will uphold
an amendatory, small area rezoning if it furthers the purposes of the
plan." In City ofPharr v. Tippet,52 the city council approved a devel-
oper's request to rezone his ten acre tract from single to multifamily
residential, contrary to the requirements of the comprehensive plan.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the adoption of a comprehensive
plan does not absolutely prohibit a city from enacting amendments to
accomplish piecemeal rezonings.53
To determine the validity of the amendment in question the court
considered three factors: (1) the compatibility of the new classifica-
tion with the surrounding area, (2) the suitability of the tract for uses
allowed under the original classification, and (3) the existence of a
substantial public need for the change.5 ' The court found that the
change in question would result in an increase of only six family
units and that the cumulative impact on the surrounding area would
be "slight and even beneficial." 55 Furthermore, the tract was at the
edge of a large, undeveloped farming area, hence eliminating the
danger of disharmonious development. Finally, evidence showed
that the city had a great need for multiple housing with little suitably
zoned, undeveloped land available.57
Although Pharr evidences reason and evenhandedness, all courts
do not fare as well when dealing with a comprehensive plan. It is
often difficult to determine whether subsequent zoning legislation
amends the plan or is simply inconsistent with it.5 8 Easily amendable
plans open the door to the possibility of spot zonings.59 Furthermore,
some jurisdictions attach either too great or too little importance to
51. City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1981).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 176-77.
54. Id. at 177.
55. Id. at 178-9.
56. Id. at 179.
57. Id.
58. Nuuanu Neighborhood Ass'n v. Department of Land, 63 Hawaii 444, 630
P.2d 107 (1981) (1968 detailed land use map held not to supersede 1943 comprehen-
sive zoning resolution).
59. Mandelker, supra note 7, at 948. E.g., Rosenberg v. Planning Bd., 155 Conn.
626, 636 A.2d 895 (1967) (amendment to a mandatory comprehensive plan to support
rezoning of one landowner's property upheld).
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the comprehensive plan.6'
To forestall arbitrary, limited area zoning amendments, some
courts treat them as quasi-adjudicative acts, hence susceptible to
greater judicial scrutiny than legislative acts.6 1 Other courts insist on
strict adherence to procedural safeguards.62 In general, one can say
that a court's willingness to approve a rezoning will increase in pro-
portion to the amount of evidence of careful planning.63
IV. CONCLUSION
Although courts have struggled to develop clearly defined tests for
spot zoning, they have not achieved a uniform standard. What con-
stitutes a comprehensive plan, a suitable land use, and the public in-
terest remains uncertain. While ad hoe decisions allow needed
flexibility, public policy determination is the province of the munici-
pal legislature, not the courts. Rezoning decisions are better left in
the hands of the zoning board so long as the comprehensive plan
embodies detailed zoning policy, a clearly defined amending process
allows planning flexibility, and affected neighboring land owners and
60. Compare Kropf v. Sterling Heights, 41 Mich. App. 21, 199 N.W.2d 567 (1972),
rev'don othergrounds, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974) (that zoning of a partic-
ular parcel was adopted as part of master plan not enough to establish validity) with
Rochester Ass'n of Neighborhoods v. City of Rochester, 258 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.
1978) (no requirement that an amendatory rezoning be consistent with city's land use
plan).
61. The Oregon Supreme Court first enunciated this doctrine in Fasano v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
Because the action of a commision in this [rezoning] is an exercise of judicial
authority, the burden of proof should be placed, as is usual in judicial proceed-
ings, upon the one seeking the change. The more drastic the change, the greater
will be the burden of showing that it is in conformance with the comprehensive
plan ....
Id. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29. Accord Little v. Board of County Comm'rs, - Mont.-,
631 P.2d 1283 (1981) (rezoning of specific tract of land more quasi-judicial decision
making than legislative zoning). Contra City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173
(Tex. 1981) (amendatory ordinance a legislative action and presumed valid). See
Harris, Rezoning--Shouldit be a Legislative or Judicial Function?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV.
409 (1979).
62. See e.g., Dover Ranch v. County of Yellowstone, - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 711
(1980) (rezoning of agricultural land to permit mobile home park denied because
board of commissioners failed to pass and publish resolution of intention to create a
zoning district).
63. R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 5.17.
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public interest groups have their say.64
CherylA. Rafert
64. Life of the Land v. City Council, 61 Hawaii 390, 606 P.2d 866 (1980) is illus-
trative of a comprehensive legislative process. In that case a developer wanted to
build an apartment house in a suitably zoned parcel. The parcel however, was in a
historic district where a building moratorium had been imposed by ordinance. The
subsequent process included: a report on the proposed development by the Depart-
ment of Land Utilization, public hearings and rejection by the Planning Commission,
public hearings by the City Council and a referral to the Planning and Zoning Com-
mittee (PZC), hearings by the PZC and referral to the Office of Council Services
(OCS), OCS recommendation of conditional approval, negotiations between the de-
veloper and affected neighbors, and submission by the developer of a scaled-down
proposal more in harmony with the esthetics of the district. Id. 871-85. Although
cumbersome, this process assured that the result was in the public interest.
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